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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

A TAX-CREDIT APPROACH TO ADDRESSING BRAIN DRAIN

MATTHEW LISTER*
INTRODUCTION
This Paper is addressed to the problem of so-called “brain drain” 1 from
developing, and especially least developed, countries to highly developed
countries. In particular, I will focus on a specific sort of brain drain, 2 and offer
an approach to addressing the problem. I shall argue that the approach proposed
here offers a more plausible and fairer way to ameliorate the bad effects of
certain sorts of brain drain than do rival approaches. It is important to note that
I do not here offer a “solution” to the problem of brain drain. I am not sure that
this is a problem that has, on its own, a “solution” without addressing much more
difficult and far-reaching issues relating to development and global justice. But,
this is a problem that can be addressed in many possible ways. I claim that the
approach I argue for here has several advantages over rival views and has some
intrinsically attractive features as well. It will not eliminate the root problem, but
doing that is, at best, a very long-term project. What I will offer here is a step
toward addressing problems associated with certain types of brain drain without
creating significant new ones.
Currently, many developing and least developed countries suffer serious
shortages of skilled professionals—doctors, teachers, engineers, nurses,
economists, lawyers, and others. 3 This shortage stems not only from a lack of
capacity to train professionals, but also due to the large number of such
* Senior Lecturer (associate professor), Deakin University School of Law (Australia) & Senior
Fellow, Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research, University of Pennsylvania. Earlier versions
of this Paper were presented at the Pacific Northwest Political Science Conference in Portland,
Oregon in 2016 and at the Taxation and Migration symposium at the St. Louis University School
of Law. My thanks to Alex Sager, Shelley Wilcox, Alex Lenferna, Andrew Valls, Burke Hendrix,
Gillian Brock, William Thomas Worster, Lukas Moravec, Jan Rohan, David Elkins, Allison
Christians, Leila Adim, Cristina Trenta, Chad Flanders, and Henry Ordower for helpful comments
and discussion.
1. See infra notes 3–5.
2. In particular, I will focus on movement of highly skilled or educated professionals from
developing countries.
3. For discussion, see GILLIAN BROCK & MICHAEL BLAKE, Introduction: The Brain Drain
and Global Justice, in DEBATING BRAIN DRAIN: MAY GOVERNMENTS RESTRICT EMIGRATION? 1,
2–3 (2015). Brain drain “emerges wherever there is a net movement of talented and educated
persons away from an impoverished society to a wealthier one.” Id.
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professionals leaving for higher salaries, better working conditions, and more
stable lives in developed countries. 4 While the desire to better one’s life can
hardly be faulted, this movement of skilled professionals has contributed to
underdevelopment, poverty, and unacceptable levels of provision of education,
health care, and governmental administration in much of the developing world. 5
I. THE PROPOSAL
Put most briefly, with details to come, my proposal is to use a sort of tax
credit roughly akin to the foreign tax credit 6 currently available to U.S. citizens
living and working abroad, to compensate developing countries that suffer a loss
in the type of situation I will specify below. To over-simplify, the United States
(atypically, in comparison to most other countries) currently considers the
worldwide income of its citizens as taxable. 7 This potentially subjects U.S.
citizens living and working abroad to crushing double taxation. However, this
risk is greatly reduced by the availability of foreign tax credits, which allow U.S.
citizens to receive a credit against their U.S. taxes for taxes paid to the countries
in which they live. 8 Under my proposal, citizens of selected countries working
in the United States or other highly developed countries who meet the other
criteria discussed below would be charged income tax by their home countries
equivalent to what someone making the same income in the home country would
be charged. 9 This tax, to be collected by the country of employment, would be
credited against taxes owed in the country of employment, and would be
returned to the home country, thereby compensating, at least to a degree, the
home country for the lost investment in the human capital of the citizen working
abroad. The details of the proposal, and its advantages over alternatives, are
spelled out below.

4. Gillian Brock, Prosperity in Developing Countries, the Effects Departing Individuals
Have on Those Left Behind, and Some Policy Options, in GILLIAN BROCK & MICHAEL BLAKE,
DEBATING BRAIN DRAIN: MAY GOVERNMENTS RESTRICT EMIGRATION? 36, 37 (2015).
5. See id. at 38–41.
6. I.R.C. §§ 901–908 (2012).
7. U.S. Citizens and Resident Aliens Abroad, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Sept. 22, 2017),
https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/us-citizens-and-resident-aliens-abroad
[https://perma.cc/G7NS-BTYB] (“If you are a U.S. citizen . . . [y]our worldwide income is subject
to U.S. income tax, regardless of where you reside.”). Most countries do not tax the foreign-earned
income of citizens living abroad. For a helpful brief discussion of this distinction, see Ruth Mason,
Citizenship Taxation, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 179–81 (2016).
8. I.R.C. § 901. U.S. citizens and permanent residents earning income abroad may also
benefit from the “foreign earned income” exclusion. I.R.C. § 911(a). This option is not directly
relevant to my project.
9. The basic proposal would be complicated in the case of countries that use a value-added
tax (“VAT”) or another tax other than an income tax as the main form of taxation. I discuss this
further below.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2017]

A.

A TAX-CREDIT APPROACH TO ADDRESSING BRAIN DRAIN

75

Whom Does the Proposal Apply to?

A first step in assessing this proposal is understanding to whom it applies.
While the idea of “brain drain” is applied in many circumstances (such as, for
example, graduates of universities or colleges in Philadelphia leaving the city,
or better students in Kansas leaving the state to attend an out-of-state university
or leaving after graduating from an in-state university), this proposal focuses on
people from developing or least developed countries who meet the following
conditions:
1) They have received higher education or skills training;
2) This training or education was provided largely or completely at public
expense, either in the home country or abroad; and
3) The person in question has left the country to work in the developed
world within a set number of years after completing education or training
(perhaps five years, maybe as many as ten, depending on the nature of
the training and education and the needs of the home country).
To understand the nature of the proposal, it is important to see who is not
included in this list. Those who do not fall under the proposal include at least
the following people:
1) People from middle-income or wealthy countries, regardless of whether
they meet the other criteria;
2) People who self-finance their education, as opposed to those who are
educated at public expense; or
3) People whose education is financed via first-world government or
university exchange programs. 10
I do not limit the proposal to these groups because they are the only cases of
brain drain, or even the only cases of international migration from less developed
to more developed countries, that ought to concern us. For example, Amy ReedSandovol has recently and persuasively argued that many of the same
considerations that justify concerns about migration by skilled workers from
developing countries to the developed world also apply to migration by lowskilled or unskilled workers. 11 Similarly, brain drain from middle-income
countries may also give rise to similar problems as those addressed by this
proposal. This raises the obvious question of why the proposal should be
restricted to those set out above.

10. In such cases, other, arguably more restrictive, requirements, such as the return residency
requirement for a U.S. J visa may be applicable and appropriate. See Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1995 §§ 101(a)(15)(J), 212(e), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(J), 1182(e) (2012). This topic lies
outside the main focus of this Paper.
11. Amy Reed-Sandovol, Towards a More Inclusive Understanding of the “Brain Drain,” 36
S. AFRICAN J. PHIL. 91, 93–95 (2017).
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A convergence of two factors explains why this proposal is especially
appropriate for addressing problems stemming from brain drain in the cases
considered above. First, those picked out by the criteria above have received
special benefits provided at the expense of their society at large, arguably
providing grounds for significant duties to the home society on the part of the
recipients of the benefits. 12 Secondly, because those here considered are from
the least developed countries, there is a general duty on the part of well-off
countries to help the least developed advance to a state where they are able to
provide a decent life for their citizens. 13 These conditions coincide in the
situation set out above, suggesting a special need to devise a method to
ameliorate difficulties arising from brain drain in these cases. Finally, it is worth
noting that this proposal does not depend on seeing skilled workers who leave
their country of origin as “‘assets’ that the state should command because it has
it has invested money in people’s education,” a claim made against several
proposals seeking to deal with brain drain by Alex Sager. 14 The claim that home
states have against citizens working abroad is not on the members themselves,
but on a fair return of the societal resources devoted to their training at public
expense, the sort of return implied by the idea of society as a system of fair
cooperation.
With the outline of to whom the proposal applies in place, our next question
is how long it will last in relation to any particular person. The general answer
is that it will last long enough to fully compensate the home country for the loss
of the investment in the skilled worker. This will most likely be determined via
standard terms applied to particular sorts of workers (nurses, doctors, lawyers,
engineers, etc.) from particular areas of the world. In most cases this will last at
least for several years.

12. For helpful discussion of this point, see Anna Stilz, Is There an Unqualified Right to
Leave?, in MIGRATION IN POLITICAL THEORY: THE ETHICS OF MOVEMENT AND MEMBERSHIP 57,
70–71 (Sarah Fine & Lea Ypi eds., 2016). Stilz also develops an account of duties on the part of
members of a society based on a natural duty of justice, though this is less central to the cases I
wish to consider.
13. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES: WITH “THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON
REVISITED” 5 (2d ed. 2000) (“In regard to these burdened societies we must ask how far liberal or
decent peoples owe a duty of assistance to these societies so that the latter may establish their own
reasonably just or decent institutions.”). For helpful discussion, see SAMUEL FREEMAN, JUSTICE
AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS ON RAWLSIAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 264 (2007); JON
MANDLE, GLOBAL JUSTICE 102–24 (2006).
14. Alex Sager, Methodological Nationalism and the ‘Brain Drain,’ in THE ETHICS AND
POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION: CORE ISSUES AND EMERGING TRENDS 221, 232 (Alex Sager ed.,
2016). A somewhat similar claim, though with a different theoretical background, is made by
Fernando Tesón. See Fernando R. Tesón, Brain Drain 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 899, 906–11 (2008).
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Some Details About the Mechanics of the Proposal

If a proposal designed to help developing countries cannot suggest
reasonable steps for its instantiation, it is of little use spending time considering
it. If a proposal is plausible in light of many currently existing conditions, its
plausibility increases greatly. 15 In particular, for this proposal to be plausible, it
must be able to function without the development of many new inter or
transnational institutions and in light of the limited institutional capacity of many
developing countries. The key to this proposal is to start with standard income
tax payroll deductions of the sort common in many developed countries. 16 I will
focus on how such a system would work in the United States. Here, taxes are
withheld each pay period for the purpose of paying income taxes. 17 When
someone files a tax return, it is decided how much of the withheld money is kept
by the government, and how much is refunded to the citizen. 18 My proposal
would make use of this same process.
Under this proposal, we start with a list of relevant countries. When a citizen
of one of these countries files a tax return, certain further questions would be
asked, such as whether the person works in a relevant field and whether they
were educated at public expense. Alternatively, this information, which is often
an essential element of a visa application form, 19 may be gathered by
immigration officials and then transmitted to the tax authorities. If the person
falls into the relevant categories, then a “credit” is applied to the taxes owed to
the United States on the U.S. earned income, equivalent to the taxes that would
be paid on a similar income in the home country. 20 This credit would then
15. Of course, the existence of the Trump administration at the time this Paper is being written
renders it, in practice, academic at best. Yet, we may hope that the situation will change soon, while
the other factors making implementation difficult which I here consider are likely to be longer
lasted.
16. In the case of developed countries that rely heavily on a VAT rather than an income tax
with payroll deduction, this process would have to be developed in a different way. Such a
development is beyond the scope of the current Paper.
17. Understanding Payroll and Withholding Taxes, U.S. TAX CTR., https://www.irs.com/arti
cles/understanding-payroll-and-withholding-taxes [https://perma.cc/2ESK-LDZH] (“[T]he IRS is
basically withholding your anticipated tax payment as you earn it.”).
18. See Understanding How Income Taxes Work, U.S. TAX CTR., https://www.irs.com/arti
cles/income-tax [https://perma.cc/CY68-EN76].
19. Information about the education of, and employment field of, nonimmigrant visa
holders—the field under which the vast majority of those of concern in this Paper fall—is required
to be provided by the would-be employer in the United States as part of the visa application process.
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FORM I-129:
PETITION FOR A NONIMMIGRANT WORKER 4, 5, 19, 23 (2017), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/
files/files/form/i-129.pdf [https://perma.cc/4D5L-45MF].
20. If the home country depends heavily on a VAT as opposed to an income tax, then the
relevant tax authorities could determine a stipulated amount, taken as an estimate of what a typical
person with a similar income would pay in total taxes in the home country, with relatively little
difficulty.
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function in a way very similar to the foreign tax credits, reducing the claimant’s
U.S. (or other host country) tax bill by the amount that would have been paid to
the home country if the home country were exercising universal taxation. This
credit would not provide a refund to the person, however, but rather provides the
basis for a fund that may then be transferred to the home country of the person
in question. As this money is already in possession of the U.S. government, via
payroll deductions, there is no need for further steps for collection, assuming
that the “credit” does not exceed the amount otherwise owed to the government
of residence. (If the amount that would be owed on a similar income in the home
country is greater than the amount owed to the country of residence, we would
be faced with a deficit. Whether this deficit should be ignored, topped up by the
government of the country of employment, or made up by the worker is a
difficult question that I will not address at this time.) This money may then be
transferred to the country of citizenship, with or without conditions, a topic to
be discussed below.
II. ADVANTAGES OF THE PROPOSED PROGRAM
This proposal has advantages over the status quo, over other proposals for
addressing the problem of brain drain, and several of what I will call “intrinsic”
advantages. I discuss these in turn.
A.

Advantages over the Status Quo

Currently, there is no systematic or general approach to addressing the
problem of brain drain in relation to skilled workers, trained at public expense,
moving from developing countries to highly developed countries. Even those
who think that little can acceptably be done about this problem 21 recognize that
there is a problem here, insofar as these countries are unable to meet their need
for skilled professionals, and this need itself leads to further problems. My
proposal would provide these countries with significant funds which could be
used to either train new professionals, to provide better pay for local
professionals, making emigration less attractive (poor pay and bad working
conditions are among the reasons why many developing world professionals
leave their home countries), 22 or to pursue other development projects, whether
these are directly related to the cases at issues (such as providing better resources
for doctors or nurses) or otherwise seen as important to the country (such as
improving primary education, public health, or infrastructure).

21. Michael Blake is perhaps an example. See, in particular, his reply to Brock in Michael
Blake, Blake Responds to Block, in GILLIAN BROCK & MICHAEL BLAKE, DEBATING BRAIN DRAIN:
MAY GOVERNMENTS RESTRICT EMIGRATION? 286, 286–95 (2015).
22. See Gillian Brock, Introduction to Part I, in GILLIAN BROCK & MICHAEL BLAKE,
DEBATING BRAIN DRAIN: MAY GOVERNMENTS RESTRICT EMIGRATION? 11, 12 (2015).
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Furthermore, my proposal may provide some incentive for highly developed
countries to reduce the recruitment of highly skilled professionals from the
developing world. Hiring such persons would reduce the domestic tax revenue
for the developed country, as the money being “credited” against host country
taxes is passed back to the developing country. This would make recruitment of
such professionals costly for the country of employment. Since it is sometimes
suggested that the recruitment of skilled professionals from the developing to
the developed world, especially those trained at public expense in the developing
world, is itself problematic and arguably unjust, 23 this incentive to reduce such
recruitment may be a further advantage. While the recruitment is often done by
private parties, who would not directly face the loss in tax revenue, this loss may
either be passed on to the private parties as a surcharge, if necessary, or, when
the recruitment is done via government programs, this fact may reduce the
government’s incentive to engage in such recruiting. 24 In this Paper, I do not
want to claim that such recruiting is always problematic or unjust. This seems to
me to be a complicated question with difficult empirical aspects to work through.
But, insofar as it is problematic or unjust, my proposal provides means to help
address this issue by making the recruitment more expensive, and so less
attractive, to developed countries.
B.

Advantages over Other Proposals

In the literature on brain drain, there are two main rivals to my proposal:
restrictions on emigration (usually temporary in nature) 25 and variations on the
so-called “Bhagwati tax” on emigrating skilled workers. 26 My proposal has
advantages over both of these alternatives. In relation to emigration or travel
restrictions of the sort argued for by Gillian Brock, Peter Higgins, Anna Stilz, 27
and others, my proposal, first, has the advantage of providing a significantly
smaller restriction on personal liberty. Even if (like me), one accepts that there
is no basic right to free movement, and even if (again, like me) one accepts that,
23. See, e.g., PETER W. HIGGINS, IMMIGRATION JUSTICE 213–14 (2013).
24. Countries could also conceivably engage in country-of-origin discrimination in providing
visas to relevant skilled professionals so as to avoid the loss of tax revenue that this proposal would
entail. Such a scheme is considered by Higgins, for example. See id. at 206–07. Though it would
take me too far from the focus of this Paper to defend the claim, such a proposal seems to me to be
a deeply problematic departure from the core liberal principle that each person be treated as an
individual, subject to rules that could be individually justified to him or her.
25. See sources cited infra note 27. Such proposals would prevent those educated at public
expense in relevant countries from emigrating for some set period of time.
26. A Bhagwati tax is, most generally, an “exit tax” paid by a would-be immigrant with the
intent of compensating her or his country of origin and for the training investment made in her or
his skills. See source cited infra note 32, at 22. The tax would “constitute a simple and rough-andready way for emigrating professionals to compensate the [home country].” Id.
27. See, respectively, Brock, supra note 4, at 48–51; HIGGINS, supra note 23, at 225–27; Stilz,
supra note 12, at 74.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

80

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:73

in certain circumstances, contract-like provisions may justify temporary bans or
restrictions on emigration, it is better if these bans are avoided, as they, at least,
infringe on significant interests held by the people in question, and at least
arguably restrict important liberties. If we are able to find a proposal that deals
with the most urgent aspects of the brain drain problem, as understood here,
without imposing these significant burdens or infringements on interests and
liberties, we ought to do so. According to Anna Stilz, this argument does not
depend on the idea that there is some “general ‘right to liberty’” but only on the
acceptance that people have a strong liberty interest in being able to craft their
own plans of life, and that emigration is often an important way to do this. 28 The
significant infringement on the ability to craft one’s own way of life that comes
with emigration restrictions would only be acceptable if they have either been
clearly voluntarily undertaken, or else if there are no other alternatives. As my
proposal provides an alternative, there is good reason to avoid these interest and
liberty reducing approaches. 29 Because Stilz herself notes that these restrictions
can only be justified when they are “necessary to ensure distributive justice for
others,” 30 the alternative to emigration restrictions provided by the proposal
shows them to be inappropriate.
Furthermore, proposals to limit emigration have the potential of reducing
investment in skills in developing countries, further promoting the problem they
seek to address. There is significant reason to think that the possibility of
emigration is a major reason that people in developing countries acquire higher
education and advanced skills and also that not all of those who gain this
education and skill will, in fact, leave, even if they had intended to do so when
starting. 31 The possibility of using funds gathered by means of my proposal to
increase wages and improve working conditions in developing countries gives
us further reason to think that many educated and highly skilled workers may

28. Stilz, supra note 12, at 59, 61–62.
29. Stilz and others often seek to limit the liberty and interest reducing impact of their
proposed emigration restrictions by making them quite short. Stilz, for example, suggests a oneyear period of compulsory service for doctors. See id. at 74. It seems very unlikely to me that such
short periods of service, especially by relatively newly trained professionals, would be likely to
meet the needs of the country of training. If anything, such a short period of service by a newly
trained professional might worsen the problem, by locating the least productive years of the
professional’s service in the home country, allowing the wealthy host country to escape even more
training costs. However, as the term of compulsory service grows longer, its plausible compatibility
with liberal principles of justice decline, at least in the vast majority of cases. This tension helps
show the general implausibility of compulsory service programs to address the problem of brain
drain, I claim.
30. Id. at 72.
31. See Michael Blake, The Right to Leave: Looking Forward, in GILLIAN BROCK & MICHAEL
BLAKE, DEBATING BRAIN DRAIN: MAY GOVERNMENTS RESTRICT EMIGRATION? 155, 167 (2015)
(discussing how Ghana has coerced citizens to stay by “withholding nursing certificates from those
who do not practice for some time within Ghana”).
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remain in the host country under my proposal, without the incentive destroying
features of the emigration restriction proposals. Finally, my proposal is fairer to
those who do not have the means to self-fund their education. Most proposed
restrictions on emigration focus, with good reason, on those who are educated
at public expense, leaving out those who self-fund their education. But, it seems
perverse to put extra burdens on those who are, almost certainly, already less
advantaged than those who are able to self-fund their educations. The fact that
Brock’s proposal would do this, while my proposal would put no extra burden
on those who are educated at public expense, shows my proposal to be fairer.
My proposal also has significant advantages over the so-called “Bhagwati
tax,” first proposed by economist Jagdish Bhagwati 32 and since modified many
times. In its original and most common form, the Bhagwati tax is a sort of exit
tax, paid by the skilled workers who leave his or her home country to work in
the developing world. 33 The tax may be paid in one installment or, as is the more
common suggestion, in installments over time. 34 Typically, it is suggested that
a new international institution, under the auspices of the United Nations, would
collect this money and disperse it to developing countries. 35 This is a serious
flaw in the proposal that is avoided by my project. It is a virtue of proposed
changes to international relations and law that they be “institutionally
conservative”—that is, that they make as few changes to the existing order as
possible, while still providing a moral improvement. 36 These days, proposals for
new international agencies and institutions are, perhaps unfortunately,
implausible. Therefore, if the problem of brain drain can be addressed without
needing to create new institutional bodies, and without needing to depend on
forming new multilateral treaties, it is a significant advantage. My proposal
meets both desiderata. It relies almost entirely on currently existing
organizations—immigration agencies for visa application information
gathering, payroll tax deductions, and the regular tax system to work out the
amount of the credits. Even the eventual transfer of funds would not require the
development of new institutions. Furthermore, this proposal would not require a
multilateral agreement. Even if such an agreement would be desirable, it would
be possible for this proposal to be put in place even by a single country without

32. For a clear and developed version, see Jagdish N. Bhagwati, The Brain Drain Tax
Proposal and the Issues, in TAXING THE BRAIN DRAIN: A PROPOSAL 3, 20–22 (Jagdish N.
Bhagwati & Martin Partington eds., 1976).
33. Id. at 20 (“[I]t would be a surtax on the incomes of the professional emigrants . . . .”).
34. Id. (suggesting that the tax would be paid over a “reasonable period, such as 10 years”).
35. Id. at 20–22.
36. There is some similarity between my claim here and Allen Buchanan’s call for
“progressive conservatism” in reforming international law. See ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE,
LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 63
(2004). I here focus, however, on the need to not postulate the development of currently implausible
new institutions if we are to make short-term moral progress.
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it causing any perverse incentives or causing serious harm to the country.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, my proposal has the advantage over the
Bhagwati tax because it allows the home country to engage in worldwide
taxation 37 while avoiding double taxation. 38 In most proposals, the Bhagwati tax
is paid by the migrant in addition to their normal country of employment tax
burdens, leading to less incentive to gain and advance skills, and to an unfair
burden being placed on the people in question. 39 My proposal avoids double
taxation, making it fairer and less distortionary.
C. “Intrinsic” Advantages
The proposal set out in this Paper also has several of what I will call
“intrinsic” advantages—features that increase its plausibility, not just in
comparison with other proposals, but also evaluated on its own terms. First, my
proposal helps avoid the problem that many developing countries have in
collecting taxes, given that the developed host country does the collection. While
it is conceivable that a developing country could try to implement something
similar to my proposal on its own, it is unclear whether it would be successful
in collecting the money, and merely instilling a penalty for non-payment would
likely have the perverse incentive of discouraging the migrant from returning
home and breaking the bonds between the migrant and his or her home society
in other ways. 40 My system avoids this problem by making use of the tax
infrastructure in the developed world, allowing those eligible for the “credit” to
claim it via the same process as filing taxes, claiming normal tax credits, and
applying for a visa. Furthermore, other institutional infrastructure already in
place would serve to help this program function. For example, a list of eligible
countries may be derived from the list of countries eligible for preferences under

37. As is suggested, for example, by Stilz. See Stilz, supra note 12, at 75.
38. The unfairness of double taxation, even leaving aside the issue of whether the burden is
born by one already disadvantaged by coming from an underdeveloped country, is ably shown by
Ruth Mason. See Mason, supra note 7, at 181–208. There are also daunting practical complexities
that would arise with the sort of general worldwide taxation proposed by Stilz and others. See id.
at 212–21. It is perhaps unreasonable to expect philosophers to be experts on tax policy, but
ignoring the significant compliance problems that would arise from worldwide taxation, perhaps
especially for developing countries that already have difficulty with tax collection, renders many
discussion of using taxation to address brain drain less than helpful.
39. Sager has also drawn attention to the way in which many proposals to address brain drain
place a significant portion of the burden on already disadvantaged people from the developing
world. See Sager, supra note 14, at 221–22. Unlike Sager, however, I agree with those he criticizes
that there is a significant problem here, and that developed countries have an obligation to address
it.
40. As noted by Mason, such results are not unusual in relation to the United States’ global
taxation scheme, and as attempts to improve enforcement have increased, these results have become
more common. See Mason, supra note 7, at 172–77.
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the General System of Preferences 41 in trade law, or for other trade benefits. This
would prevent the need for an expensive, case-by-case system of determinations.
My proposal can also easily accommodate conditions on the transfer of
funds, if this proves to be desirable. This could include conditions on the
government in general, with tight restrictions on the transfer of funds to highly
corrupt or aggressive governments, or to governments with significant human
rights violations, to more fine-tuned conditions, such as that the money be spent
on education, or further skills training, or on development more generally. While
such conditions would increase the administrative costs of the proposal, this
might be acceptable insofar as it helps ensure that the money foregone by the
host country actually serves to ameliorate the damage caused by brain drain. My
proposal can also be adjusted so as to provide a larger or smaller credit as the
worker is in the country of employment for a longer time, or the home country
has more need of certain types of skilled workers than others. Finally, my
proposal avoids not just double taxation from the Bhagwati tax, but also homecountry/host-country double taxation, thereby proving to be fairer and nondistortionary.
III. ADDRESSING SOME WORRIES ABOUT THE PROPOSAL
I will finish by addressing, briefly, several worries that might be raised
against the proposal argued for here. The first, and perhaps most fundamental,
is the worry that this proposal, even if it is supported by liberal principles of
justice, is too utopian, in that it requires developed countries do something that
is at least not clearly in their interest—collect tax revenue, but transfer it to other
countries, while providing an off-setting credit to their own taxes. While it is
true that my proposal requires that highly developed countries forego a certain
amount of tax revenue, without any certain or immediate return benefit, I do not
think that this is, itself, utopian. For example, it is not clear that this proposal is
more utopian than the transfers that come from many other international aid and
development plans, or the gain that is foregone via the Generalized System of
Preferences for developing countries in trade agreements. Furthermore, my
proposal is likely to be better for countries of employment than would homecountry based restrictions on emigration. And, if the lost revenue is seen to be
too high, some of this could be recouped via charges to employers of foreign
workers. (This might also help address certain worries about the recruitment of
skilled workers from developing countries, by making it more expensive, but
without prohibiting it.) Finally, my proposal could conceivably be tied to certain
reciprocal agreements with developing countries, to ensure that the funds were

41. For a useful, brief discussion of the GSP, see Generalized System of Preferences (GSP),
OFFICE U.S. TRADE REP., https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/preference-programs/gen
eralized-system-preference-gsp [https://perma.cc/SUM2-8E4N].
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properly used or that corruption was reduced, or, if incentives for actions by
developed countries are needed, increased access to markets.
The proposal defended here is also better than the status quo and the
alternatives from the perspective of the developing countries, providing further
plausibility. For reasons given above, my proposal is better from the homecountry perspective than travel or emigration restrictions would be, in that it
does not discourage investment in skills and education in the public.
Furthermore, participation in the program may be made a legal requirement by
both the home and the host country, ensuring a high degree of compliance with
the program (especially insofar as there is no intrinsic reason to not participate,
given that those taking part are not subject to double taxation, as they would be
under some alternative proposals).
A final worry about the proposal argued for here is that it would come to
little good if the money raised is not properly used. What reason do we have to
think that it would be used well? And, what if the money raised by this program
is not, in the end, enough to help developing countries meet their needs for
skilled workers and other aspects of and adjuncts to development? These worries
are significant, and cannot be fully answered, especially before the proposal is
tried. However, we should keep in mind that our comparison is not with an ideal
program or with the ability to solve the problems of the developing world by
fiat, but rather with the status quo and with alternative proposals. None of the
other options avoid these same difficulties, and they have significant other
problems, as I have indicated. Additionally, some degree of monitoring of the
use of money is possible. Given these facts, this worry, while real, should not
keep us from ignoring the benefits of the proposal.
CONCLUSION
Problems associated with “brain drain” by skilled professionals from the less
developed world to the developed world are only one aspect of a fiendishly
difficult problem. While there is no magic bullet that will solve global poverty,
finding ways to ameliorate problems associated with the movement of skilled
professionals from the less to the more developed world is one step in addressing
this issue. However, these steps are only likely to be useful and acceptable if
they are both fair (compatible with liberal principles of justice) and practicable,
meaning that they do not depend on implausible developments of international
institutions or assume that developing countries have tax collection powers that
they clearly do not. The proposal developed in this Paper takes steps to develop
such a system, and therefore deserves further consideration.

